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DEATH AND THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY:
WHAT HATH MODERN MEDICINE WROUGHT?
JoHN H. THoRNToN*
MARCIA J. STAFF**
Recent developments in modem medicine enable physicians and other
health-care providers to prolong artificially the lives of many comatose
patients.' Through the use of advanced feeding techniques2 and artificial
pulmonary and cardiac support,3 patients who previously would have
been considered dead may remain technically alive. Additionally, many
states have recognized a person's right to choose not to have his life
artificially sustained by the use of such measures.' This situation creates
an ethical dilemma for health care providers and a legal quagmire for
lawyers and providers of insurance.5 This quandary may be further
complicated by future medical advances that may allow insurance policy
holders-through the use of cryogenics-to choose to have their bodily
functions temporarily suspended.
This article examines the legal importance of current and future
medical advances for providers and procurers of insurance. It deals
with (1) the definition of death, considering the importance of the defini-
tion in relation to accidental death benefit provisions; (2) the-right of
an insured or an insured's family to direct that life-prolonging treat-
ment be withheld or withdrawn, examining the effect of such action
on suicide exclusions in life insurance policies; and (3) the possibility
of an insured choosing to have a total cessation of bodily functions
through the use of cryogenics, analyzing the obligation imposed by
a life insurance policy in such a situation. Finally, an exploration of
these three areas of medical advancement should suggest legal
mechanisms and strategies that the life insurance contract might incor-
* Ph.D., Associate Professor of Insurance, North Texas State University.
** J.D., Assistant Professor of Business Law, North Texas State University.-Ed.
1. E.g., R. VEATCH, DEATH, DyINo AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 2 (1976).
2. Comatose patients may be fed through hyperalimentation (the introduction of a feeding
tube into the large neck veins leading to the heart). ENCLYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE,
NURSING AND ALLIED HEALTH 485-86 (B. Miller & C. Keane eds. 1978)..
3. A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHIYsIOLoGY 355-56, 528-29 (5th ed. 1976).
4. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUT. L. REv. 228 (1973). See infra text accompanying notes
39-78.
5. Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a Single Standard?, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1323, 1325-27 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brennan & Delgado].
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porate to clarify what is quickly becoming one of the most ambiguous
of legal relationships.
I. Definition of Death
A typical life insurance policy provides that the insurance company
promises to pay the stated amount to the beneficiary upon "due proof"
of the death of the insured.6 Some policies also provide that benefits
may be increased (typically doubled) if the insured dies as a result of
an accident and if death occurs within a specified time. A typical Ac-
cidental Death Benefit (ADB) provision provides as follows:
The company agrees to pay an Accidental Death Benefit upon
receipt at its Home Office of due proof that death of the insured
resulted, directly and independently of all other causes, from ac-
cidental bodily injury, provided that death occurred within ninety
days after such bodily injury and while this benefit is in effect.7
Prior to recent medical advances, courts and insurance carriers had
little difficulty determining when death occurred, and consequently,
when a policy became payable because of the death of the insured.
Common Law Definition of Death
In determining when a person is dead, courts have long held that
death is "[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physi-
cians as a total stoppage of the circulation of blood, and a cessation
of the animal and vital functions consequent hereon, such as respira-
tion, pulsation, etc."' Courts in most jurisdictions adopted this or a
similar definition, which they readily and easily applied to most
situations.
Concept of Brain Death
While the courts continued to apply the common law definition,
medical technology developed two complementary capabilities-() the
ability to feed and perform respiratory functions for patients without
brain functions, and (2) the ability to determine when a person is totally
and permanently without brain function. Thus, patients who are actually
devoid of brain function (i.e., brain-dead) are artificially provided with
6. J. GRIEDER & W. BEADLEs, LAW AND THE LiFE INSURANCE CoNTRAcT 187 (3d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as GRIEDER & BADLE.s].
7. Id. at 216. The time period within which the death must occur varies with the policy.
8. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 546, 317 S.W.2d 275,279 (1958) (citing BLACK's LAW
DICTnONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed.); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478, 481-82
(1950) (citing BLACK'S LAW DircoNARY (3d ed.). Death has also been defined as a "departure
from life." Finch v. Edwards, 239 Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d 665, 670 (1946).
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respiration and circulation. Under the common law definition of death,
these persons are alive because their vital functions (respiration and
circulation) have not ceased. Theoretically, these brain-dead persons
can be kept from common law death for an undetermined period of
time.
Situations such as these raise difficult issues when the brain-dead,
artificially sustained patient is insured by a policy of life insurance.
Notable among these issues is the question of when a life insurance
policy becomes payable if a patient is breathing with the aid of a
respirator but is totally lacking brain function.
Legal scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to this problem
of definition. One solution is to give the attending physician the discre-
tion to determine when a person is dead.9 In contrast, a second ap-
proach would remove all discretion from attending physicians and calls
for a return to a strict, but more sophisticated, statutory alternative
to the common law rule."0 Yet another proposal suggests that the defini-
tion should not be confined to a single fixed rule or discretionary ap-
praisal by a physician, but instead depend upon the purpose for which
it is needed.1
The Medical Standard of Death
The first solution is generally considered to be inappropriate. At least
one court has held that the law's interest in defining death is too great
to leave the decision completely to medical science.'2 A discretionary
standard of death simply leaves the status of an insured patient and
insurer too uncertain to properly and uniformly assay their rights, duties,
and obligations.
Statutory Definitions of Death
The second solution-to adopt a statute defining death-has been
chosen by a majority of jurisdictions, although the definitions enacted
are not uniform.
Recognizing the need for a definition of death that considers more
than heart and respiratory functions, in 1970 the state of Kansas passed
the first statute defining death as the lack of either heart and respiratory
9. E.g., Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 1(b) (1968). Contra, In re, Bowman, 94 Wash.
2d 407, 412; 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980).
10. E.g., Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human
Death: An Appraisal and Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87 (1972); Note, Legislation: The Need
for a Current and Effective Statutory Definition of Death, 27 OKLA. L. Rnv. 729 (1974).
11. Brennan & Delgado, supra note 5; Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Dworkin]; Felton, Heart Transplants & Life Insurance, 23 C.L.U. 22 (1969).
12. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 412, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980).
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functions or the cessation of brain function. 3 Oklahoma was among
four states that subsequently adopted a definition of death similar to
the Kansas standard.
1 4
Also recognizing the need for a definition of death, the Law and
Medicine Committee of the American Bar Association drafted a Model
Definition of Death Act in 1975. The American Bar Association defini-
tion subsequently was incorporated into the Uniform Brain Death Act
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1978. The Uniform Brain Death Act defined death as
follows: "1. [Brain Death] For legal and medical purposes, an individual
who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain,
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this section
must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards.""s
In 1979 the American Medical Association adopted its own Model
Determination of Death Statute, which subsequently was adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to supersede the Brain Death Act. The Uniform Determination of Death
Act as adopted in August 1980 provides as follows: "1. [Determina-
tion of Death] An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,
is dead.'
6
The Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the Act makes it clear that
the Act codifies the existing common law basis for determining death,
i.e., "total failure of the cardiorespiratory system.' 7 The drafters con-
cede that the overwhelming majority of cases will be determined under
this standard.
Thus, the Act provides that physicians are to determine death on
the basis of lack of brain function only when artificial means of support
preclude a determination of heart-lung death.8 Five states have adopted
statutes based on the Uniform Determination of Death Act. 9 Several
13. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1979); Kennedy, Special Article: The Kansas Statute
on Death-An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENO. J. MED. 946, 948 (1971).
14. MD. PuB. HA.LTH CODE ANN. §§ 5-201 to -203 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1980);
63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-301(g) (1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 146.001 (Supp. 1978). For an analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of a statute patterned after the Kansas enactment, see Note, Legisla-
tion: Oklahoma's Statutory Definition of Death, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 615 (1982).
15. Uniform Brain Death Act § 1 (1978). See Nav. REv. STAT. § 451.007 (1981); W. VA.
CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 35-18-101 (Supp. 1982).
16. Uniform Determination of Death Act § 1 (1980). See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (Supp.
1982).
17. Uniform Determination of Death Act (1980) (Commissioner's Prefatory Notes).
18. Id.
19. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-136 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
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other jurisdictions had previously adopted a similar standard that makes
cessation of heart and lung activity the primary test for death but allows
a physician to apply a brain-based standard when artificial means of
heart and lung support are being provided."0
The comments to the Uniform Act make it clear that for a person
to be brain-dead, the entire brain must cease to function. The drafters
noted that the "entire brain" includes the brain stem as well as the
neocortex. Thus, the Act is applicable only to cases of death of the
"entire brain" as distinguished from "neocortical death" or "persistent
negative state."'"
Although a majority of jurisdictions have defined death to include
at least some form of brain death in at least limited situations,2  a
significant number of jurisdictions make no statutory provision for
defining death and adhere to the common law definition of death as
cessation of heart and lung activity. 3 Thus, a person can be "dead"
in one jurisdiction and "alive" in another. Such inconsistent defini-
tions of death make insurance providers and procurers uncertain of
when, or if, an insurance policy is payable.
This problem can be solved short of adoption of a uniform act by
all states-a prospect that seems far off in view of the competing legal
and medical definitions already adopted. These checkered state enact-
ments need not throw the nation's insurance industry into chaos if a
uniform law or contractual provision can be adopted that is specifically
and narrowly applicable to the problem of death in the life insurance
context.
Life Insurance Definition of Death
Defining death in the context of when a life insurance policy becomes
payable requires an examination of the purpose of life insurance, and
more particularly, the purpose of increased benefits when an insured
dies of accidental causes within a specified time after the accident.
It is generally agreed that the purpose of life insurance is not
indemnity.24 An insured can procure insurance on his life in any amount
CODE ANN. § 53-459 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. § 5218 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.71 ( vest Supp. 1982).
20. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1982); ALAS. STAT. § 9.65.120 (Su pp. 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 382.085 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANr. § 702.8 (West 1979).
21. Uniform Determination of Death Act (1980) (Commissioner's Prefatory Notes).
22. The statutes are summarized in Table 1.
23. A. Guy-rON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYsIOLOGY 355-56, 528-29 (5th ed. 1976).
24. R. KMON, BAsic TE XT ON INsJRANcE LAW § 3.5(a) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KEETON];
E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 155 (2d ed. 1957).
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and can name anyone as beneficiary, regardless of the insured's wealth
or relati6nship with the beneficiary.5
If the beneficiary procures the insurance, the law requires the
beneficiary to prove an insurable interest in the insured at the time
the beneficiary obtains the insurance.26 However, the beneficiary need
not have an insurable interest at the time the policy matures."
Accidental death benefit clauses in life insurance policies may be
considered, in certain limited instances, as indemnifying the beneficiaries,
i.e., compensating the beneficiaries for the increased psychological and
physical trauma caused by accidental death.28 This argument may be
compelling when a wife or husband is killed suddenly in a car acci-
dent. It is decidedly less compelling when, for example, a university
is the beneficiary of a life insurance contract. Insurers contractually
limit the length of time an insured may survive after an accident to
ensure that the accident causes the insured's death. Thus, there is only
a tenuous connection between the concept of indemnity and the life
insurance contract. Death coming beyond the contractually determined
time period, even if in fact accidental, will not trigger liability, even
if it leaves a destitute family in its wake.
Against this background, courts have experienced little difficulty in
enforcing double indemnity time limits in cases involving an acciden-
tal injury that produces a lingering death, although one state has enacted
legislation that forbids the use of such time limits. 9 Most jurisdictions,
however, uphold the time limits." These jurisdictions typically pro-
vide that such contract terms will be enforced when they are clear and
unambiguous.' The few jurisdictions that have refused to enforce the
time limits have based their decisions on the expectations of the parties32
and public policy.33
Adoption of a brain-death oriented standard for determining when
a policy is payable is a logical solution to the many cases where ac-
cidents leave their victims comatose."' A standard, contractual provi-
25. GRIEDER & BEADLES, supra note 6, at 145; KEErON, supra note 24, at § 3.5(c). Contra,
Brennan & Delgado, supra note 5, at 1330 n.38.
26. GRIEDER & BEADLES, supra note 6, at 145; KEETON, supra note 24, at § 3.5(b).
27. KEETON, supra note 24, at § 3.5(b); PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 162.
28. Brennan & Delgado, supra note 5, at 1330-31.
29. 31 PA. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h), 89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12 (1981) (insurance regulations).
30. E.g., Fontenot v. New York Life Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 359 So. 2d 622 (1978); Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374
N.E.2d 643 (1978); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
31. Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
32. Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Waters, 213 Miss. 265, 56 So. 2d 493 (1952).
33. E.g., Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
34. It should be noted that application of this standard will not affect double-indemnity time
limits when the patient is not determined to be brain-dead within the prescribed time.
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sion defining brain death15 will solve the issue of when an insurance
policy is payable and when a person dies within the time limits prescribed
by accidental death benefit provisions. The event that makes the policy
payable can be called "insurance death."36 Insurance companies can
require that beneficiaries post bond to protect the carrier in the event
that the brain:death diagnosis is erroneous.3 1 This is a protection for
the insurer that is not provided by any of the brain-death statutes.
Defining death contractually for life insurance purposes38 will enable
insurance companies to set premiums pursuant to a recognized stan-
dard as opposed to a case-by-case determination of death. Such a defini-
tion will recognize what most state legislatures have already recognized-
that modem medicine can provide breathing and circulation for insureds
who are actually dead.
II. The Right to Die
By developing technology capable of artificially maintaining patients,
modern medical advances have created yet another problem for insur-
ance providers. Terminally ill patients can be-and routinely are-
kept alive by extraordinary life-prolonging measures. In response to
this situation, several state legislatures have recognized a person's right
to die. Known as natural death acts or "living wills," the statutes allow
a person to choose-sometimes in advance of the terminal illness-not
to have his life sustained by artificial means. (See Table 2, infra) An
examination of the acts reveals that decisions made pursuant to their
provisions may have significant implications for insurance providers.
Overview of the Natural Death Acts
Formal Requirements
The natural death acts basically allow a person to direct his physi-
cian to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when the person
suffers from a terminal condition or illness. Such enactments generally
require this instruction to be in the form of a directive. Requirements
of the directive vary with each act, although several acts are markedly
similar.39
35. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
36. Brennan & Delgado, supra note 5, at 1342 n.90.
37. Id. at 1344.
38. The authors recognize that a different definition of death may need to be recognized
for health insurance. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 629-30; Brennan & Delgado, supra note
5, at 1328.
39. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1982) with Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 3 (Vernon 1982). Only Arkansas' Death With Dignity Act is completely
different from the other acts. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1979). See Table 2 infra.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Four of the acts require that the directive be in the form specified
in the statute."° Six states merely suggest a form.4' North Carolina is
one of the six states that provides a suggested form, although the statute
points out that the form is "specifically determined to meet the re-
quirements of the act." '42 Two of the acts neither suggest nor require
a form but instead require that the directive satisfy the requirements
of a will.43
The acts generally provide that the document must be executed before
at least two witnesses and a notary. The Texas statute is fairly typical44
in its requirement that a witness cannot be related to the declarant
by blood or marriage or entitled to any portion of the estate of the
declarant on his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto
or operation of law; or the attending physician; an employee of the
attending physician or a health care facility in which the declarant is
a patient; a patient in a health care facility in which the declarant is
a patient; or any person who has a claim against any portion of the
estate of the declarant upon his decease at the time of execution of
the directive.45 The abundance of safeguards in the Texas Act can be
attributed, at least in part, to political opposition to the Act. 4'
The California, Oregon, and District of Columbia acts impose addi-
tional witness requirements when the instrument is executed by a pa-
tient in a long-term care facility. In those situations the acts require-
as additional protection for the declarant-that he directive be witnessed
by someone from an appropriate state agency.7
Although the formal requirements vary with each act, it is clear that
legislatures designed the requirements of formality-whether by pre-
scribed or suggested form or by compliance with the Statute of Wills-to
make the declarant appreciate the serious consequences of his decision
and to minimize undue influence by interested persons.8
40. CAL. HEALTH & SnTy CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp.
1982); OR. Rkv. STAT. § 97.055 (1979); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. Am. art. 4590h § 3 (Vernon 1982).
41. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(c) (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 449.610 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT § 90.321(c) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1982).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(d) (Supp. 1981).
43. ARK. STAT. ArN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1981).
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3) (Supp. 1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 97.055 (1979).
45. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 3 (Vernon 1982).
46. Comment, The Right to Die and Substituted Judgment in Texas, 18 Hous. L. REV. 851,
861 n.45 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
47. CAL. H- LTn & SAfETY CODE § 7188.5 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2423
(Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055(3) (1979).
48. Comment, supra note 46, at 857 n.27.
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Capacity to Execute
Only one of the statutes requires that a doctor diagnose the patient
as terminally ill prior to the execution of the directive. The Idaho Act
requires that the person executing the directive be a "qualified patient"
at the time the directive is signed.9 The Act defines "qualified pa-
tient" as "a person of sound mind at least eighteen (18) years of age
diagnosed by the attending physician to be afflicted with a terminal
condition.""0 Thus, in Idaho, a person cannot prospectively execute
a directive regarding his wishes as to life-sustaining treatment prior
to being afflicted with a terminal condition.
None of the other acts require that the declarant be a qualified patient
in order to execute the directive. The other acts basically allow a direc-
tive to be executed by any adult person. The directive cannot be used
by the physician, however, until the declarant becomes a "qualified
patient."'II
Two of the acts provide for different consequences resulting from
a directive, *depending upon whether the declarant issued the directive
before or after becoming a "qualified patient." In Texas, a directive
executed prior to the patient's certification as terminally ill (i.e., becom-
ing a "qualified patient") is merely advisory unless the directive is re-
executed after the diagnosis.5 2 When the directive is merely advisory,
the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining equipment is left
solely to the physician. The Texas Natural Death Act specifically pro-
vides that in making the decision, the physician may consider factors
other than the directive, including information from the patient's family
and the nature of the illness in determining "whether the totality of
circumstances known to the attending physician justifies effectuating
the directive.""
The California Act has a similar provision but is even more specific
in its requirements. A directive is not binding in California unless the
declarant was a qualified patient at least fourteen days prior to ex-
ecuting the directive."4 When the provision is not satisfied, the direc-
tive is given the same status as an advisory directive in Texas. In prac-
49. IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1982).
50. Id. § 39-4503(3). Most of the acts require that the terminal condition be certified by
two physicians. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050(5) (1979).
51. The Kansas definition is similar to the Idaho definition. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,102(e)
(1980).
52. TEXAS REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 7(c) (Vernon 1982).
53. Id.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1982).
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tice, the families of California or Texas patients who have executed
directives before certification are likely to decide whether life-prolonging
equipment will be withheld or withdrawn.
In contrast, the Arkansas statute does not require that the patient
be in a terminal condition prior to signing the directive or prior to
the doctor's effectuating the directive." This has led one author to
comment that the Act could be used to commit suicide, 6 although other
commentators conclude that such a result would be inconsistent with
the spirit of the Act."
Thus, only in Idaho must a physician diagnose a declarant as ter-
minally ill for him to execute a directive. The health of the declarant
will be relevant, however, in Texas and California in determining the
weight to be given the directive by the attending physician.8
Time of Effect of Directives
The acts are quite diverse as to the time when the directive takes
effect. Seven of the acts require that death be imminent before life-
sustaining procedures can be withheld or withdrawn.9 These directives
typically provide that the physician can withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining procedures where such procedures would serve to artificially
prolong the life of the declarant. The California definition of "life-
sustaining procedure" is typical.
"Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or in-
tervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to
sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which, when applied
to a qualified patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the
moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physi-
cian, death is imminent whether or not such procedures are
utilized."
"Imminent" is not defined in any of the acts but is generally thought
to mean a prognosis of death within a matter of days.6 Thus, even
55. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801" to -3804 (Supp. 1981).
56. Comment, supra note 46, at 858 n.32.
57. Simpson & Armbrust, A Critical Analysis of the Arkansas Death With Dignity Act, I
U. ARK. LrrrE ROCK L.J. 473, 476 (1978).
58. Additionally, Oregon considers a directive advisory if the patient is mentally incompetent
when the time comes to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures. OR. REV. STAT. § 97.075(2)
(1979).
59. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(6) (Supp. 1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West
Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(4) (Supp. 1982); NEV. REr. STAT. § 449.610 (1979); OR.
REV. STAT. § 97.055 (1979); TEX. REy. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 2(3) (Vernon 1982); WASH.
REy. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(4) (West Supp. 1982).
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1982).
61. Comment, supra note 46, at 859 n.35.
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in the face of a binding directive, the acts do not authorize physicians
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining procedures unless death is likely
to occur within a few days (although the exact number is not specified).
While such acts have gone far in providing terminally ill patients with
a means to end their suffering, they have not determined the effect
of such an act on the patient's life insurance coverage.
Right to Die and Life Insurance
Life insurance policies often contain a provision which provides that
the policy will not become payable if the insured's death is the result
of suicide.62 A typical policy provides the following: "Suicide. The
suicide of the insured within two years from the Policy Date or the
Issue Date, whichever is the earlier, is a risk not assumed under this
policy. In such an event, however, there shall be a death benefit of
the amount equal to the premiums received, without interest." 3
Regular Coverage Beyond the Suicide Clause
Regarding coverage under regular life insurance (term, endowment,
or whole life), where death follows issuance of a directive after the
expiration of the suicide limitation, there should be no question of
the contractual validity. Even if an insurer believes and can prove that
a directive to remove life-support equipment is suicidal in its intent,
there can be little doubt that the policy must be enforced. The same
public policy that led to enactment of the natural death acts mandates
that such clauses be disregarded where the death falls within its provi-
sions. In addition, until courts find a directive by a relative-beneficiary
to be murder, it is unlikely that the insurer could deny payment of
the proceeds to that beneficiary."
Regular Coverage Under the Suicide Clause
Policies commonly provide that if the insured dies by suicide within
a given period after policy issuance, the insurer's liability is limited
to the premiums that have been paid to that date.6 1 Whether expressed
in the suicide clause or under the policy loan provision, policies typically
62. GREMER & BEADLrs, supra note 6, at 205.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 562-67.
65. E.g., American Council of Life Insurance, specimen $10,000 "Council Life Policy"
#000/00, section 1.3 (2-year period); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, specimen
$100,000 "Whole Life Paid Up at 90 #1 000 001, section 1.4 (1-year period); New York Life
Insurance Company, specimen "Retirement Endowment at Age 65" #00 000 001, "General Pro-
visions: Suicide" (1-year period); Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company specimen "Renewable
Convertible Five Year Term Life Policy" form #0779T01, "General Provisions: Suicide" (2-year
period) (policies on file with authors).
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reduce the amounts payable by any outstanding policy loans." It should
also be noted that the suicide exclusion clause typically applies only
when the insured was sane at the time he took his own life,67 although
the language "sane or insane" only occasionally appears in policies.8
The issue that naturally arises in connection with the various natural
death acts is whether a directive by the insured, executed during the
period affected by the suicide clause, would constitute suicide. If this
situation is not specifically covered by a state's right to die statute,
there is some likelihood of a challenge by insurers. Most of the cur-
rent state statutes, however, provide that such a directive may not be
a legal basis for policy avoidance because of a suicide exclusion.69 For
example, the Alabama Code specifically states that "[tihe withholding
or withdrawal of life sustaining procedures from a qualified patient
in accordance with the provisions in this chapter shall not, for any
purpose, constitute a suicide ... ."7o The wording of this statute raises
a related question, i.e., does the suicide exclusion apply when the
patient-intent upon suicide-inflicts the terminal wounds?
The suicide defense is further clouded by added constraints in many
statutes. Several of the acts state: "No policy of life insurance shall
be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified
patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary."'"
However, these same acts also provide that they do not permit deliberate
actions "to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.' 7
Since suicide could be the proximate cause, leading in an unbroken
sequence of events to the directed withdrawal of life-support devices,
it is arguable that a life insurer could deny coverage and merely re-
fund premiums under the suicide clause. It must be noted, however,
that provisions preventing an insurer from "impairing or invalidating"
the policy may control. A more complex problem arises when the suicide
attempt occurs prior to expiration of the suicide clause time period,
66. Of the policies, supra note 65,'only the New York Life policy's suicide clause specifically
stated that the amount payable was reduced by a policy loan.
67. GRIEDER & BEADLES, supra note 6, at 548.
68. Because the American Council policy, supra note 65, does not contain this wording, and
because the Council policy's wording might reasonably be expected to be representative of its
member companies, this change seems probable. Also, only the Fidelity Mutual policy contains
the wording "sane or insane."
69. The various state statutes and pertinent provisions are summarized in Table 2, infra.
70. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9(a) (Supp. 1982).
71. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9(b) (Supp. 1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7192(b)
(West Supp. 1982).
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while the withholding of life support occurs after that period expires.
Certainly, it could be argued that coverage should be limited to premium
refund in such a situation.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions that have no legislation allow-
ing withdrawal of life support and the ensuing natural death, the prob-
lem facing insurers is even more acute. Clearly, physicians are ter-
minating life-support procedures in these jurisdictions, without the
benefit of statute, at the request of either the patient or the patient's
family." Since the termination of life-support procedures in those situa-
tions is not sanctioned by statute, insurers may argue that the termina-
tion more clearly resembles murder or suicide. This argument, however,
would seem to ignore the basic right that is recognized when a person-
terminally ill and facing imminent death-is allowed to die naturally.
Arguably, the person is not committing suicide because he is dying
soon in any case. Thus, the suicide exclusion should not bar recovery
unless, perhaps, the insureds inflicted the terminal condition upon
themselves, regardless of when the life-sustaining treatment is withheld.
Accidental Death Benefit (ADB)
Even more difficult problems arise when coverage is provided under
ADB clauses.74 As discussed previously, most ADB provisions limit
coverage to death that occurs within a specified number of days of
the accident.71 What, then, is the effect on an insured's life being arti-
ficially sustained beyond the specified time limit?
The time limits specified in ADB provisions traditionally have been
enforced even though "herculean medical care" sustains the insured's
life beyond the time period.76 However, some courts77 and insurers7"
have begun to recognize that the time limit in ADB provisions should
not be enforced when the accident causes the death, even though death
73. Dallas Times-Herald, Oct. 23, 1982, at 22-A, col. 1; Nov. 29, 1981, at 42-A, col. 1.
74. See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
75. GRIEDER & BEADLs, supra note 6, at 234 (noting a 90-day limit); S. HEtrBNER & K.
BLACK, Lisa INSURANCE 200-01 (10th ed. 1982) (arguing courts should ignore the time limit when
life support techniques are used); E. VAUGHN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RiSK AND INSURANCE 609 (3d
ed. 1982) (noting a 90-day time limit); Council Life Policy, supra note 65 (providing 120-day
time limit).
76. Mullins v. National Gas Co., 273 Ky. 686, 690, 117 S.W.2d 928,- 931 (1938). Accord,
Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
77. E.g., Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977); Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
78. Some insurers reportedly have an in-house policy of waiving time limits where the in-
sured's death was caused by the accident. Note, Death Be Not Proud-The Demise of Double
Indemnity Time Limitations, 23 DE PAUL L. Ray. 854 (1964).
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occurs beyond the time limit. This line of reasoning seems particularly
appropriate when the insured's life is artificially prolonged. Because
only a small minority of jurisdictions have recognized a person's right
to have life-prolonging procedures terminated, it is likely that the in-
sured will have little choice but to have his life artificially sustained
(perhaps beyond the ADB time limit). In such a situation, ADB coverage
could be provided as long as the requisite causation is proved, i.e.,
that the accident is the proximate cause of the death.
Thus, giving an insured the right to direct that life-support procedures
be withheld or withdrawn, as only a minority of jurisdictions have done,
gives the insured an option regarding the time of his death. Without
this option, the uncertainty of ADB time limits presents difficult issues
for insurers and insureds. An insurer can easily remedy this difficulty
by providing specific provisions regarding the effect of life-prolonging
treatment on the ADB time limit. A policy provision of this nature
would produce two desired results: (1) less litigation of ADB time limits,
and (2) more definite liability exposure that can be more accurately
underwritten.
IIL. Cryogenics and the Future-What Next?
Cryogenics and Cell Preservation
There is ample reason for life insurers to plan for the possibility
that terminally ill, living persons might be frozen in hopes that they
could be revived at some future date when treatment is available for
their illnesses. dready, a number of persons have had their bodies
frozen at -196°C immediately upon their deaths, and approximately
a hundred more reportedly have contracted for similar treatment."9
While this current treatment clearly occurs after death, it is conceivable
that a cryogenic "state of the art" could enable the courts or legislatures
to allow persons to contract for such a process prior to death, without
fearing application of various murder, manslaughter, or suicide statutes.
Indeed, medical technology has made significant recent advancement
in the field of cryogenics. Indications are that cryogenics, like pros-
thetic hearts, will soon move from the realm of science fiction to scien-
tific fact.
While the formation of intracellular ice is a major problem to be
dealt with in the freezing of living persons (in addition to osmosis which
can cause either too much or not enough cellular shrinkage),8" the use
79. Friendly, Reese & King, Chill Strikes the Cryonics Business, NEwswEEK, July 7, 1980, at 9.
80. Farrant, General Observations on Cell Preservation, in Low TEmPERATURE PRESERVA-
TION N MEDInIN AND BIOLOGY 4-5 (M. Ashwood-Smith and J. Farrant eds. 1980).
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of cryoprotective solutions has resulted in the successful freezing and
thawing of several kinds of cells. Included are fetal corneas and skin,
fetal rat pancreases, human thyroid tissue, rat parathyroid and liver
cells, canine heart valves and veins,8' the sperm of many animals (in-
cluding humans),2 mouse embryos,83 red blood cells,84 and bone
marrow." Critical factors that thus far have been determined to affect
cellular survival rates include:
-speed of freezing and thawing;"6
-timing and speed of freezing and thawing in multicellular layers;87
-choice of cryoprotective solutions, which can penetrate the cells
or merely envelop them;88
-ph, especially for animal cells,89
-storage temperature;90
-mutation control;98
-concentration of cryoprotective solutions;
-dilution of cryoprotective solutions during thawing/removal; and
-osmotic problems associated with cryoprotective solutions.2
In addition, the interaction of variables further complicates the pro-
cess. For example, an increase in the concentration of the cryoprotec-
tive agent often dictates a slower rate of cooling, while that same in-
crease in concentration may prove toxic to the cells because it promotes
too rapid a rate of osmosis before freezing is accomplished.93
The subject of cryonics currently is undergoing extensive research,
and the possibility of significant breakthroughs, however improbable,
must be said to exist. Although Brian Pippard, a pioneer researcher
in low temperature physics, noted in a 1961 speech that his generation
81. Ashwood-Smith, Low Temperature Preservation of Cells, Tissues and Organs, in id.,
at 19, 27, 31-32, 34, 36-37, 40.
82. Polge, Freezing of Spermatazoa, in id., at 45, 60-61.
83. Wittingham, Principles of Embryo Preservation i id., at 66.
84. Rowe, Lenny & Mannoni, Cryopreservation of Red Blood Cells and Platelets, in id.,
at 85-114.
85. Shaefer, Bone Marrow Stem Cells, in id., at 151.
86. Farrant, supra note 80, at 4-8, 12-13.
87. Ashwood-Smith, supra note 81, at 19.
88. Trejo, Some Considerations in the Cryogenic Preservation of Cultures, in ROUND TABLE
CONFERENCE ON THE CRYOGENIC PRESERVATION OF CELL CULTURES 10 (A. Rinfret & B. LaSalle
eds. 1975).
89. Shannon, Gherma & Jong, The Role of Liquid Nitrogen Refrigeration at the American
Type Culture Collection, in id., at 5.
90. Rowe, Lenny & Mannoni, supra note 84, at 95-96.
91. Cellular storage of 200 to 1,000 years should be feasible before background radiation
appreciably reduces probable survival. Wittingham, supra note 83, at 79-80.
92. Ashwood-Smith, supra note 81, at 19, 25.
93. Farrant, supra note 80, at 5-6, 8-9, 14.
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of researchers would leave this research area "a dust bowl" because
they would have so thoroughly exhausted its possibilities,9" this has
not come to pass. For a major life insurer to ignore the possible ap-
plication of cryogenics to the preservation of living persons could be
as grave an error in strategic planning as was the ignoring of asbestos-
caused injury by property-liability insurers and brokers.95
This line of reasoning leads to the question of what treatment might
(and should) be afforded the insured's life insurance policy during the
period of cryonic suspension under the following set of circumstances:
(1) The insured undergoes cryonic treatment prior to death;
(2) Legal changes protect the insured and the cryonic provider from
charges of suicide, murder, or manslaughter; and
(3) Those changes dictate that the insured is not to be pronounced
dead until failure to revive when attempted (despite interim absence
of respiration, circulation, or brain waves).
Accidental Death Benefit (ADB)
Clearly, if the insured can be revived after cryonic suspension, there
is no statistical basis for arguing any other current biological age than
the age at the .time of freezing. Biological processes are suspended during
this deep-freeze procedure, thus preventing aging. 6 Therefore, it can
be argued that the ADB coverage could be contractually suspended
during the freezing process, and then resumed upon its cessation.
However, it is unlikely that such an exclusion would apply in light
of the "accidental nature" of the failure to revive and the doctrine
of proximate cause, unless clear wording to that effect is included in
the original ADB provision. The absence of such a provision could
result in a court's interpreting a continuation of coverage over many
years, while the insured stays frozen at one biological age, thus suspend-
ing the insurer's age-based right to collect interim premiums.
This situation is complicated by the possibility that an accident during
cryonic suspension might lead to the improper thawing of (or to direct
physical injury to) the frozen insured. Unless ADB coverage clearly
is suspended during this time, there is good reason to suspect that the
94. Richardson, Low Temperature Science-What Remains in it for the Physicist?, PHYsics
TODAY, Aug. 1981, at 46.
95. The problems caused by this oversight are abundantly clear. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (lst Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
No. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); "A Small Firm's
Answer to Suits Over Asbestos," Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1982, at 21, col. 2; Manville Sues In-
surers for Still More, Bus. INs., Sept. 6, 1982, at 31, coI. 1.
96. Wittingham, supra note 83, at 79.
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courts might determine that such coverage does exist, and thus force
payment.
Regular Coverage Beyond the Suicide Clause
Regular life insurance coverage beyond the suicide clause can be
classified into two policy groups, non-cash value and cash value.
Non-cash Value Life Insurance
Most term life insurance has no cash value, and thus could be treated
much as ADB provisions might be treated. Premiums could be sus-
pended upon freezing of the insured and resumed upon revival, with
the policy clearly providing that the face amount of the policy is not
payable until there is failure to revive. Since accidental death is not
an issue, the insurer has little hope of denying coverage at the time
of failure to revive. However, the insurer will have had the use of a
portion of one year's unearned premium for a significant time period
and should make provision either to pay its future value plus the policy
face value upon failure to revive, or to credit that future value against
further premiums, or to refund it in the event of successful revival
of the insured.
Cash Value Life Insurance
Although some multiyear, level-premium term policies accumulate
appreciable cash values, this article concentrates on the endowment
form of life insurance, including whole life. During the insured's
cryogenic suspension, what happens to the policy and its cash value?
By comparison, the questions raised by a term policy's unearned
premiums pale in significance. Should the courts be called upon to
decide such a question, insurers might be hard-pressed to point to a
single solution unless such a solution is contained in the policy.
Possible solutions include the following:
(a) Coverage can be suspended immediately upon freezing of the
insured, and renewed upon attempted revival, with continuation based
upon the same biological age as at the time of freezing. Earnings credited
on existing cash values could be accumulated in a separate, interest-
bearing account. Those earnings would be payable in addition to the
policy face value in the event of failure to revive, or payable to the
policy's owner upon revival of the insured.
Thus, if one examines the $10,000 "Council Life Insurance Com-
pany Policy," issued to a male at age 35, the following might develop
for the insured who is frozen at age 45. Cash value at age 45 is $1,719,
which would earn interest, with the interest also earning interest. If
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the insured stays cryogenically suspended for fifty years, and if an in-
terest rate of 6% is credited, the amount of an annuity of 1 per annum
is 290.3359.1" Because 6% of $1,719 equals $103.14, $103.14 x 290.3359
yields a sum of $29,945.24 to be added to the policy's face value at
the time of the attempt to revive. Thus, the policy would pay $10,000
+ $29,945.24, or $39,945.24 if the insured could not then be revived;
or if the insured is revived, the policyholder would be able to claim
$29,945.24, plus having the $10,000 contract, with its $1,719 in cash
value, to continue in force from the policyholder's age 45.
(b) Coverage can be suspended immediately upon freezing of the
insured, interest can be credited on an annually compounded basis as
an accumulation in policy cash values during cryogenic suspension,
and coverage resumed upon the revival attempt. Continuation of the
policy is based on the cash value accumulated as the determinant of
the insured's "actuarial age" under the policy.
For example, if the insured is frozen at age 45 with a $10,000 whole
life policy issued at age 35 as in the preceding example, and is revived
ten years later, the following would occur. The amount of an annuity
of 1 for ten years, at 6%, is 13.1808.98 $103.14 per year for ten years,
times 13.1808 equals $1,359.47. Therefore, the insured's cash value
at attempt to revive is $1,719 pli$1,359.47, or $3,078.47. The in-
surer's net amount at risk is $10,000 minus $3,078.47, or $6,921.53.
If the insured cannot be revived, the beneficiary receives $10,000. If
the insured is revived, the policy picks up as though the insured were
between the sixteenth year (cash values of $2,891) and the seventeenth
year (cash values of $3,095). The insurer could allow a partial premium
payment to satisfy the remainder of the seventeenth year, or could simply
round the cash value upward to that of the next highest policy year.
Diagrammatically, this can be represented as in Figure 1.
Using the previous example in which the insured is frozen at age
35, and assuming a 6% rate of interest, if the cryogenic state con-
tinued for thirty years, the amount of annuity of 1 would be 79.0582.99
$103.14 (6% of $1,719) times 79.0582 equals $8,154.06. $1,719 plus
$8,154.06 equals $9,873.06: Or, more simply, the compound amount
of 1, at 6% for thirty years, is 5.7435.100 $1,719 x 5.7435 = $9,873.08.
Although the cash values for the last years of the specimen policy in
question are not shown, one can assume that a cash value of $9,873.06
would dictate a "policy age" for the insured under the policy of at
least ninety-five years. (Since $9,873.06 x 1.06 = $10,465.44, one ac-
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FIGURE I
POSSIBLE TREATMENT OF A WHOLE LIFE POLICY
ISSUED AT MALE AGE 35
WITH
INSURED CRYOGENICALLY SUSPENDED FOR
TEN YEARS BEGINNING AT AGE 45







* Insured is frozen.
+ Attempt to revive insured.
B: THE REVISED POLICY (AFTER REVIVAL OF INSURED)
$10,000
net amount at risk
$3,05 ,fcash value
$3,095 - - -.....- --
35 5210
(17th policy year)
tually could assume age 99.) Certainly, there is very little of the policy's
period of coverage remaining.
Such treatment can be argued as being logical, in that there is no
valid statistical evidence of the effects of cryogenic suspension upon
life expectancy, even given successful revival of an insured. Certainly,
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there is no reason to expect an increase in life expectancy, and every
reason to expect some decline because of cellular damage during the
procedure. Consequently, a reduction in the remaining period of cov-
erage could be a reasonable treatment. Further, this treatment assumes
return of the insured's cash value, plus an appropriate interest return.
A by-product of this approach is the apparent acceleration of the
aging process for purposes of the insurance policy, which is assumed
if the insured is frozen for a long period of time. This is shown in
the second example, where thirty years of cryogenic suspension resulted
in a "policy age" change from 35 to 99 (64 years). However, it is easily
explained because cash value accumulation during the freezing process
need not be reduced to pay for the policy's net amount at risk, which
has been suspended during the insured's frozen state.
Settlement Options
Perhaps the most significant financial exposure exists within the typical
life insurance settlement options if the beneficiary undergoes cryogenic
suspension. While the lump sum option is unaffected, and the interest
option actually might allow the insurer the use of principal at a low
cost, what would result if the life annuity option is chosen? Given
today's options, if the beneficiary-annuitant is frozen and could not
be declared legally dead, it seems reasonable to expect that the courts
might require continuing life annuity benefit payments. Theoretically,
this could continue for tens, even hundreds, of years, with the
beneficiary-annuitant instructing that these payments be used to pay
the costs of sustaining the frozen state.
As a simple safeguard, life insurers might note that a single-life
annuity benefit stream would cease upon cryonic suspension of the
annuitant, with interest credited to any remaining actuarial principal,
and with larger benefit payments remaining actuarial principal, and
with larger benefit payments (based on principal at freezing plus ac-
cumulated interest) beginning upon successful thawing. Joint-and-
fractional life annuities might be reduced upon freezing of one annui-
tant, with any remaining actuarial portion of principal attributed to
the frozen annuitant treated in the same manner as that of a single-life
annuitant. Joint-and-full benefit streams might be continued so long
as one annuitant remains alive and unfrozen, with any actuarially deter-
mined portion of principal again being treated like that of a single-life
annuitant.
Waiver of Premium
Clearly, being frozen at -196°C is not today being contemplated by
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most persons as a total disability; however, it could fit the current
definition. Since life insurers very likely do not intend to pay their
insureds' premiums under waiver of premium (WP) provisions if the
insureds are cryogenically suspended, a simple statement suspending
WP when such suspension occurs, together with one of the suggested
treatments for life insurance, should be sufficient to defuse this possible
problem area.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Advances in medical technology have only begun to alter the timing
of death for life insurance purposes. Year by year, technological
advances have made the great certainty of death less certain. It is becom-
ing increasingly common for states to recognize the concept of brain
death when the insured is breathing with the aid of artificial respiratory
support. Additionally, a few states have recognized the right of an in-
dividual to have artificial life-sustaining devices withheld or withdrawn.
The impact these situations will have upon the maturation of a life
insurance policy is not certain, particularly in light of the fact that
the statutes examined are neither widely adopted nor uniform. Future
advances in medical science-notably the development of cryogenics-
may present insurers with still more problems regarding the payment
and/or suspension of life insurance coverage in certain situations.
Recent cases involving liability coverage'"' provide the insurance
industry with ample warnings that its life insurance policies must
anticipate problems caused by medical advances. While recently inter-
preting a liability policy in a manner most favorable to the insured,
one court placed the blame for the decision squarely on the insurer,
stating: "Because the insurance industry did not fully appreciate the
extent of potential liability.., we have this impossible problem befor6
us. There is no truly satisfactory solution we can make.' 0 2 This ad-
monition is fair warning to the insurance industry that it must take
the lead in addressing the real and potential issues caused by medical
advances, which currently are left unanswered by standard life insurance
policies.
101. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982);
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of No. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 191), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982).
102. Insurance Co. of No. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1226 (6th
Cir. 1980), aff'd on reh., 657 F.2d 814 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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Table 1
Statutory Definitions of Death
[Vol. 36:285
Jurisdiction Statute Standard
1. Alabama Ala. Code 9 22-31-1 Primary std. - heart-lung
(Supp. 1982) Secondary std. - brain-function
2. Alaska Alaska Stat. 8 9.65.120 Primary std. - heart-lung
(Supp. 1981) Secondary std. - brain function
3. Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. Brain-function and absence of
§ 82-537 spontaneous breath
(Bobbs. Morrill Supp.
1981)
4. California Cal. Health & Safety Brain-function
Code 8 7180
(West Supp. 1982)
5. Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Brain-function or heart-lung
8 12-36-136 (Supp. 1981) function
6. District of D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2401 Brain-function or heart-lung
Columbia (Sup,. 1982) function
7. Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. Primary std. - heart-lung
9 382.085 (Supp. 1982) Secondary std. - brain-function
8. Georgia Ga. Code Ann. 9 88-1715.1 Brain function
(Harrison Supp. 1981)
9. Idaho Idaho Code § 54-1819 Brain-function or heart-lung
(Supp. 1982) function
10. Iowa Iowa Code Ann. Primary std. - heart-lung
9 702.8 (1979) Secondary std. - brain-function
11. Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-202 Brain-function or heart-lung
(Supp. 1979) function
12. Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. art. 9 Primary std. - heart-lung
8 111 (West 1982) Secondary std. - brain-function
13. Maryland Md. Health Code Brain-function or heart-lung
E 5-201 to-203 (1982) function
14. Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Primary std. - heart-lung
Ann. § 333.1021 (1980) Secondary std. - brain-function
15. Montana Mont. Rev. Code Ann. Brain-function
§ 50-22-101 (1981)
16. Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Brain-function
§ 451.007 (1981)
17. New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. Brain-function or heart-lung
§ 12-2-4 (1980) function
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss2/19
19831 DEATH AND THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY 307
Table 1 (cont.)
Jurisdiction Statute Standard
18. North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. Brain-function or heart-lung
990-323 (1981) function
19. Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. Brain-function and absence of
63, & 1-301(g) (West spontaneous breath
Supp. 1981)
20. Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. Brain-function or heart-lung
§ 146.001 (1981) function
21. Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. Brain-function and heart-lung
9 53-459 (Supp. 1982) function
22. Texas Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Brain-function
art. 4447t (West Supp.
1981)
23. Virginia Va. Code Ann. Brain-function or heart-lung
§ 54-325.7 (1982) function
24. Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. Brain-function or heart-lung
9 5218 (Supp. 1982) function
25. West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. Brain-function
8 16-10-2 (Supp. 1982)
26. Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. Brain-function or heart-lung
8 146.71 (West Supp. function
1982)
27. Wyoming Wyo. Stat. § 35-18-101 Brain-function
(Supp. 1982)
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Table 2
Natural Death Acts














Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. follow no no
§§ 82-3801 to requirements









District of D.C. Code Ann. suggested yes yes
Columbia §§ 6-2421 to
-2430 (Supp. 1982)
(Natural Death)
Idaho Idaho Code required no yes
§ 39-4501 to*-4508 (Supp. 1982)
(Natural Death Act)











New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. none yes yes
§9 24-7-1 to -11
(1981) (Right to Die)
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. suggested no no
§8 90-320 to -323
(Supp. 1981)(Right
to Natural Death)
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. required yes yes








Washington Wash. Rev. Code suggested no yes
An.1§ 70.122.010
to .905 (West Supp.
1982)(Natural Death
Act)
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